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Recent Cases
The Eighth Circuit concluded, however, that the consumer expectation test
is not the clear standard for determining what is unreasonably dangerous
under Missouri law. The court followed the precedent of the Missouri
Supreme Court which has been reluctant to establish a strict definition for
the term "unreasonably dangerous."
Noting that the instruction which was
given to the jury contained a broadly
worded definition of unreasonably dangerous, the court concluded that the
instruction was fair to both sides. The
court found, therefore, that the jury was
properly allowed to make the ultimate
determination of whether the contact
trip nailer was unreasonably dangerous.
Contributory Fault Defense Requires
a Plaintiff's General Knowledge
Bostitch further argued that it should
have received its requested jury instruction on the contributory fault defense.
Contributory fault is a complete defense to a strict product liability action
in Missouri. In order to assert such a
defense, the defendant is required to
prove that the plaintiff knew of the
danger associated with his actions, and
voluntarily and unreasonably exposed
himself to a known risk. The defendant
must also show that the plaintiff's conduct caused or contributed to the damage sustained. Bostitch maintained that
it proved these elements based on the
testimony and circumstances of the accident.
The Eighth Circuit held that Bostitch
should have received the benefit of the
contributory fault instruction. The court
did not agree with the trial court's conclusion that Drabik had to have specific
knowledge that his head was in the
precise range of the nailer. Instead, the
court found that a showing of Drabik's
general knowledge that the product
posed a significant risk of causing the
accident in question was sufficient to
warrant the instruction. The court found
that Bostitch proved Drabik had general knowledge of the risk of accidental
discharge when using a contact trip
nailer. The court concluded that testiVolume 6 Number 1 / Fall 1993

mony concerning Drabik's knowledge
of the product created a jury question as
to whether Drabik voluntarily and unreasonably accepted the risk which resulted from his actions.
Evidence of Other Injuries Must Be
Substantially Similar To Evidence In
Case On Trial
Finally, Bostitch contended that it
was unduly prejudiced by the admission of evidence involving other injuries allegedly caused by pneumatic
nailers. Drabik, however, maintained
that the evidence of other injuries presented at trial was substantially similar
to the accident in question and properly
admitted.
The Eighth Circuit concluded that
the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting extensive evidence of injuries that were not substantially similar
to Drabik's. This evidence prejudiced
Bostitch and discredited its expert witness in the eyes of the jury. The court
held that the admission of other accident evidence is limited to those events
which are substantially similar to the
events in the case at trial. The court
determined that this limitation would
ensure that trials remain focused on the
accident which forms the basis of the
case. 4o
Nicole Rudman

Supreme Court Strikes
Ban On In-Person
Solicitation By CPAs
InEdenfieldv.Fane, 113 S.Ct. 1792
(1993), the United States Supreme Court
held that a Florida ban on in-person
solicitation of prospective clients by
certified public accountants (CPA), Fla.
Admin. Code Ann. r. 21A24.002(2)(c)(1992), violated the First
Amendment where the solicitation was
for a lawful commercial transaction with
truthful, non-deceptive information.
The Court found that the ban did not

I

directly serve the state's legitimate interests of protecting consumers and
maintaining CPA independence.
Building a Client Base
Respondent Scott Fane, a CPA,
moved to Florida from New Jersey
where in-person solicitation by CPAs
was legal. Unable to effectively build a
new practice using other methods of
solicitation, he sued the Florida Board
of Accountancy (Board), challenging
the constitutionality of the state's ban
on in-person solicitation. Fane asserted
that the ban presented a serious obstacle to a CPA attempting to gain new
clients because most businesses would
be willing to rely on the CPAs already
serving them.
The District Court for the Northern
District of Florida granted summary
judgment to Fane, enjoining enforcement of the ban as applied to CPAs
soliciting clients in the business context, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorariand
affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's decision.
Court FindsState's Interests Substantial
The Court first established that inperson solicitation by CPAs constitutes
commercial expression which is protected by the First Amendment. The
purpose of the First Amendment in the
commercial context is to safeguard
broad access to complete and accurate
information and to allow both the solicitor and the prospective client to
openly discuss their potential relationship. The Court noted, however, that
unlike private speech, commercial
speech is linked inextricably with the
commercial arrangement that it proposes.
Because the state's interest in the
underlying transaction gave it a legitimate interest in the expression itself,
the Board was required to meet only an
intermediate standard of review to survive First Amendment scrutiny. The
Court followed the CentralHudsontest
which required the Board to prove: 1)
23
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that the state had a substantial interest
in regulating the activity and 2) that the
law was tailored in a reasonable manner to serve the state's interests without
overly restricting the protected speech.
CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. PublicService Comm 'n ofNew York,
447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). The Court
found that the Board failed to meet the
second requirement of the Central
Hudson test.
The Board argued that the ban protected several substantial interests. It
asserted that the ban ensured that consumers were not being misled by fraudulent statements. It also contended that
the ban protected consumers' privacy
interests by preventing persistent CPAs
from overreaching and using aggressive tactics. Furthermore, the Board
argued that the ban was necessary to
maintain the fact and appearance of
CPA independence. The Board reasoned that solicitation would compromise the independence necessary to
audit fairly a business or attest to its
financial statements because a CPA in
need of business might be prone to
ethical lapses. Finally, the Board argued that the public perception of CPAs
as independent would be undermined
by lifting the ban.
InterestsNot Directly Served By Ban
The Court acknowledged that the
state's interests were substantial. Nevertheless, the ban failed the second
prong of the CentralHudsontest, which
required a regulation impinging on commercial expression to advance the state's
interest directly. The Court noted that
the Board presented no evidence to
support its contentions that in-person
solicitation by CPAs would lead to
fraud, overreaching, or compromised
independence. In fact, studies in the
field indicated that such consequences
were unlikely. Furthermore, the Court
pointed out that the blanket ban was
over-inclusive, preventing in-person
solicitation by honest CPAs as well as
fraudulent or overbearing CPAs.
The Board argued in the alternative
that the ban constituted a reasonable
restriction on the manner in which CPAs

may communicate with prospective clients rather than a direct regulation of
the commercial speech itself. In rejecting that argument, the Court noted that,
even if the ban were a content-neutral
time, place, or manner restriction on
speech, the ban would still fail to serve
the state's interests in an effective or
direct way, and thus could not be upheld.
ProphylacticRule Unnecessary
Finally, the Board argued that a total
ban on CPA solicitation was necessary
because the solicitation usually occurred
in private offices where it would be
difficult to regulate or monitor. The
Board relied on Ohralik v. Ohio State
BarAss'n., 436 U.S. 447 (1978), which
upheld a ban on all in-person solicitation by lawyers.
The Court distinguished the instant
case from Ohralik. The Court pointed
out that lawyers, trained in the art of
persuasion, usually deal with uninformed and perhaps desperate clients.
In contrast, CPAs approach experienced
business executives who have the time
and resources to evaluate a CPA's offer
of services. The Court concluded that,
given the differences in clientele, solicitation by lawyers is more likely to
lead to misconduct than solicitation by
CPAs, and thus a blanket ban on CPA
solicitation is unnecessary.
Blackmun Disapproves Intermediate
Scrutiny
Justice Blackmun joined the Court's
opinion but wrote separately to voice
his disapproval of the majority's finding that commercial speech free from
fraud or duress is entitled to only an
intermediate level of First Amendment
protection.
O'ConnorCriticizesMajority'sFocus
as Too Narrow
Justice O'Connor found the Court's
focus on whether the object of the solicitation may be harmed to be too narrow. According to Justice O'Connor,
the state has the broader authority to
prohibit commercial speech which,
though harmless to the listener, may be

damaging to the reputation of the
speaker's profession. She also analogized the case to Ohralik, because attorneys as well as CPAs have professional expertise that can be used to
mislea-l or coerce a naive potential client. Finally, she contended that the
majority avoided analyzing the actual
ban under Central Hudson by improperly casting the case as an "as-applied"
challenge even though the ban applied
to all CPAs. She read the majority
opinion as implying that the ban satisfies Central Hudson by virtue of its
failure to state otherwise. Accordingly,
Justice O'Connor would reverse the
lower court and uphold the ban on solicitation. 80
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Insurer May Deny
Coverage for Artificial
Heart Transplant
In Loyola Univ. of Chicago v.
Humana Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 895 (7th
Cir. 1993), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that an insurer which denied coverage
for an artificial heart implant reasonably interpreted its policy's exclusions.
The court found that the insurer did not
waive its requirement of obtaining prior
approval before a subsequent human
heart transplant could be covered and
held that the insurer could rely on this
requirement when denying coverage.
The InsurancePolicy
Billy Via, a 44-year-old, was a qualified participant under a group health plan
provided by Humana Insurance Company (Humana). After suffering a heart
attack, he was admitted to Loyola University Medical Center (Loyola) on July 9,
1988, to undergo coronary artery bypass
surgery. Prior to his surgery, Via assigned
the benefits under his health plan to Loyola.
Humana authorized his admission to
Loyola for seven days of care.
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